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SISKEL AND EBERT AT THE 
SUPREME COURT 
Thomas E. Baker* 
REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAG-
ING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS. By Samuel Estreicher and 
John Sexton. New Haven: Yale University Press. 1986. Pp. 201. 
$20. 
INTRODUCTION 
Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert are movie critics appearing together 
on "Siskel and Ebert: At the Movies," a popular syndicated television 
program. These critics have become celebrities in their own right, yet 
they have never produced, directed, or acted in a movie; they make 
their living passing judgment on those who do. Professors Samuel Es-
treicher and John Sexton are "two sharp young law professors" with 
"impressive"1 credentials who have functioned as Siskel and Ebert by 
reviewing critically the work of the Supreme Court. They also have 
attained the celebrity status of Siskel and Ebert: their study has been 
cited and widely discussed,2 even in the work of the Justices them-
• Professor of Law, Texas Tech University. B.S. 1974, Florida State University; J.D. 1977, 
University of Florida. - Ed. 
1. Mikva, Cutting the Problem Down to Size (Book Review), 39 HASTINGS L.J. 229, 231 
(1987). Estreicher and Sexton each served as law clerk to a Supreme Court Justice - the former 
for Justice Powell during the 1977 Term, and the latter for Chief Justice Burger during the 1980 
Term. 
2. Estreicher and Sexton set out "to alter the terms of the debate over the (Supreme Court) 
overload problem," p. 71, and they have succeeded. See P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. MISHKIN & 
D. SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 45· 
46 n.79, 1874 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; Baker, The Ambiguous Independ· 
ent and Adequate State Ground in Criminal Cases: Federalism Along a Miibius Strip, 19 GA. L. 
REV. 799, 841 n.199 (1985); Baker & McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 
HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1411-12 nn.62 & 64 (1987); Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the 
Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 7 n.30, 11 n.60 (1986); Dane, Vested Rights, "Vestedness," 
and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J, 1191, 1267 n.241 (1987); Davis, "There is a Book Out •• •• ·~· 
An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1604 n.389 
(1987); Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive to Innovate, 72 VA. L. 
REV. 677, 750 n.265 (1986); Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REV. 
1417, 1418 n.6, 1450 n.100 (1987); Lawlor, Court Packing Revisited: A Proposal Eor-Rational· 
izing the Timing of Appointments to the Supreme Court, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 989 n.114, 995 
n.137 (1986); Matasar & Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and 
Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 
1291, 1384 n.431, 1386 n.439, 1388 n.445 (1986); Mullenix, A Branch Too Far: Pruning the 
Abstention Doctrine, 15 GEO. L.J. 99, 100 n.4 (1986); Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal 
Protection, and Self-Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 261, 340 n.338 (1987); Shapiro, Jurisdic· 
tion and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 563 n.118 (1985); Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases 
Per Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of 
1472 
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selves.3 These previous reviews have been remarkably favorable.4 
Redefining the Supreme Court's Role is, for the most part, a revi-
sion of the 1253-page report of the New York University Supreme 
Court Project that Professors Estreicher and Sexton initiated. 5 This 
201-page effort, according to the authors, "presents the findings of the 
[New York University Law Review] project in a manner more accessi-
ble to the nonlawyer with additional material exploring some of the 
broader implications of our study" (p. 4). I accept their repeated invi-
tations to join in the debate over federal court reform (pp. 75 & 136), 
but my chief purpose is to perform as critic for the curious reader who, 
as the moviegoer depends on Siskel and Ebert, depends on book re-
viewers to help decide if a book is worth reading. In that sense I write 
this review - with the hubris of a movie critic - so that my reader 
need not read their book. Although Professors Estreicher and Sexton 
give the proposal for an Intercircuit Panel two thumbs-down - in the 
style of Siskel and Ebert - I give their effort one thumb-up and one 
thumb-down. 6 
As an initial matter, the authors' title, Redefining the Supreme 
Court's Role: A Theory of Managing the Federal Judicial Process, is 
thrice flawed. First, it seems presumptuous. Second, while the 
Supreme Court is the highest court in the federal judicial system, it is 
only one level of a complex federal judiciary. A focus on the Supreme 
Court is much too narrow to expect needed systemic relief. There are 
Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. RE.v. 1093, 1093 n.1, 1097 n.15, 1108 n.65, 1110 n.71 (1987); 
Wallach, Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE L.J. 
1500, 1502 n.8, 1508 n.28 (1986); Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. RE.v. 991, 
1022 n.137 (1985). 
3. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pueblo of Santa Ana, 472 U.S. 237, 283 n.78 (1985) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 398 & n.8 (1985) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
4. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2, at 1093 n.2 (study is a "disciplined and catholic analysis"); 
Rowe, Book Review, 4 CoNsr. COMMENTARY 417, 418, 420 (1987) (book "develops a framework 
for analysis" and is "an important contribution to the debate"); Mikva, supra note l, at 231 
(book is "a model for academics seeking to influence the legal topography"). 
5. Estreicher & Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme Court's Responsibilities: An 
Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681 (1984). ·See also Estreicher & Sexton, Improving the 
Process: Case Selection by the Supreme Court, 70 JUDICATURE 41 (1986). 
6. I should disclose that in previous writings I have endorsed the proposal to create a new 
intermediate court. See Baker, A Compendium of Proposals to Reform the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 37 U. FLA. L. RE.v. 225, 287-88 (1985); Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1416. 
And I have been accused, by a fellow reviewer, of criticizing these authors' work "perhaps too 
stridently but with some justification." Rowe, supra note 4, at 421. 
I feel some obligation toward further disclosure. During 1985-1986, I served as a Judicial 
Fellow in the Office of the Administrative Assistant to Chief .Justice Warren E. Burger; from 
September 1986 to January 1987, I served as Acting Administrative Assistant to Chief Justice 
William H. Rehnquist. For a summary of the duties of a Judicial Fellow and an Administrative 
Assistant, see generally D. O'BRIEN, STORM CENTER 144-46 (1986); Cannon & Morris, Inside 
the Courts: The Judicial Fellows Program, 12 PS 6 (Winter 1979). However, I do not have an 
axe to grind. I do not view myself as a "minion" of either Chief Justice I have served, in either 
sense of the word, although I suppose myself to be as "loyal" an "alumnus" of their judicial 
"empire" as Judge Mikva supposes the coauthors to be. Mikva, supra note l, at 231. 
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many profound challenges facing federal court reformers who more 
properly recognize that the federal courts articulate as a system and, 
still more properly, recognize that the federal and state judiciaries are 
inextricably linked. 7 Third, the subtitle is misleading. The last chap-
ter on implications and conclusions, eight pages in all, simply does not 
justify their subtitle. They should have promised less or done more. 
The title of their article was more modest and more accurate. 
i 
A "NEW VISION" 
The authors begin with a clarion call for a new "vision" of the 
Supreme Court (p. 5). Lamentably, their offering is neither new nor 
visionary. Their straw person is the age-old myth that wronged liti-
gants may take their cases "all the way to the Supreme Court." The 
authors seem to patronize their readers to admit that "[n]o sophisti-
cated observer would argue that the Court today sits merely to correct 
error at the behest of disappointed litigants .... " 8 Yet that is their 
major, though negative, premise: the proper role for the Supreme 
Court does not include error correction. Their minor premise is that 
this "vision" is inadequately observed by the Justices and by those 
who, like me, argue that there is a need for greater unity in the na-
. tional law. Their syllogistic conclusion is a rather sophomoric "mana-
gerial model" of the Supreme Court: 
Recognizing that the Court has a finite capacity to hear cases, we argue 
that the Court's principal objectives in selecting cases for plenary consid-
eration should be to establish clearly and definitively the contours of na-
tional legal doctrine once the issues have fully "percolated" in the lower 
courts, to settle fundamental interbranch and state-federal conflicts, and 
to encourage the state and federal appellate courts to engage in thought-
ful decisionmaking, mindful of their own responsibility in the national 
lawmaking process. Following our managerial model, the Court would 
not select cases because of the presence of error or the ostensible impor-
tance of the substantive issue involved. [pp. 4-5] 
The problem, we are told, is not one of workload but of "role 
definition. "9 
Indeed. 
7. See sources cited in Baker, supra note 6, at 226 n.6. 
8. P. 2. In calling for the Court to "recast" Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 
(1803), the authors reject the notion that the Supreme Court qua court makes law only in the 
course of deciding actual disputes, insofar as it portrays the Court as available to correct error. 
Pp. 129-30. The implications of their super-court theory for sepiiration of powers, federalism, 
and constitutionalism are profound. These issues of role and legitimacy go far beyond the scope 
of my review, and fortunately the authors' expressed purpose. I was relieved to read the authors' 
nod to the notion oftimited government when they said, "We agree that the Court's legitimacy is 
ultimately traceable to its role in deciding actual controversies - and for reasons more funda-
mental than the formal notion that the 'judicial power' granted by Article III extends only to 
'cases and controversies.; " P. 129. 
9. P. 7. To me, it smacks of ill-grace, at least preliminarily, for two former law clerks to 
dismiss so blithely the testimonials of every member of the Court that workload is a serious 
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While many commentators, including the two authors and this re-
viewer, have attempted to describe the ideal appellate function, all 
contemporary writers should admit that Karl Llewellyn and Roscoe 
Pound "long ago uttered every pertinent observation."10 Llewellyn 
and Pound identified two primary appellate court functions as the cor-
rection of errors (or pronouncing correctness) in specific disputes and 
the declaration of law by creation, clarification, elaboration, or over-
ruling. In the error-correction functjon, the controlling principles of 
law are settled and the decision is whether the appeal presents a cor-
rect or incorrect application; in the declaration function, the emphasis 
is on the creation and harmonization of legal principles. 
Since the Evarts Act of 1891,11 the design of the federal system has 
assigned error-correction to the courts of appeals, which were ex-
pressly created for that task, and the declaration function to the 
Supreme Court. Congress reiterated this division of appellate function 
in the Jud,ges' Bill of 1925,12 which dramatically reduced the Supreme 
Court's mandatory jurisdiction. · 
Many of the problems with the federal court system are traceable 
to this division of appellate labor. The courts of appeals have become 
somewhat like regional supreme courts because the effectiveness of 
Supreme Court supervision has diminished with the dramatic in-
creases in the circuits' caseloads. The need for uniformity and cer-
tainty is exacerbated further by the volume of federal questions arising 
in decisions by the fifty state supreme courts. It must therefore be 
conceded that the Supreme Court operates as a "Court of Selected 
Error."13 But there remains a seemingly irresistible urge to have the 
Supreme Court act as a court of general errors. That there are poorly 
selected instances of error correction or, perhaps more accurately, dis-
agreements over particular exercises of jurisdictional discretion, 14 may 
be an inevitable cost of this most important value in case selection, 
which we all agree must be considered central to the role of the 
Supreme Court. 
The authors are not to be criticized for calling for a new vision of 
the Court. But to strive for a single all-encompassing and timeless 
vision of the role of the Supreme Court is to search for the Holy Grail. 
We may be ennobled in the effort, but we should not be disheartened 
worry, even thpugh I acknowledge that the Justices do not agree on the cause or the solution. 
See Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1402. 
10. P. CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG,. JUSTICE ON APPEAL 8 (1976) [herein-
after JUSTICE ON APPEAL]. See generally K. LLEWELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION -
DECIDING APPEALS (1960); R. POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES (1941). 
11. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
12. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
13. 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE§ 4004, at 525 (1977). 
14. E.g., Florida v. Rodriguez, 471 U.S. 386, J95-401 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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by the futility of our quest. Compare Chief Justice Marshall's vision 
of judicial review and the Court with Judge John Bannister Gibson's. 
Or compare the strong views of Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, 
Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt. There is not much of a 
shared vision among constitutional law scholars over the generations. 
Certainly at our most recent constitutional lyceum, the Senate consid-
eration of the nomination of Judge Robert H. Bork, no unitary vision 
of the Court and Constitution emerged. 15 
I suppose this is as it should be. The Court is, after all, a human 
institution; the vision actually portrayed by the Court in performing 
its role, to be distinguished from some idealized vision, must be some 
amalgam of nine chambers. When five or more happen to coincide 
there is a prevailing vision, for a time and for one object. That may be 
all that we can expect from such a powerful institution with its scope 
of discretion and responsibility of decision. 
EARLIER PROPOSALS 
Professors Estreicher and Sexton rightly credit Chief Justice Bur-
ger as the catalyst for consideration of reform of the federal court 
structure. Contrary to their implication, however, the efforts to create 
a new national appellate court did not originate with him. 16 But the 
authors begin with the 1972 report of the Freund Committee,17 which 
recommended creation of a national court of appeals. Next, the so-
15. See generally SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK 
TO BE AN AssOCIATE JusncE OF. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, s. EXEC. REP. 7, 
lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); The Bork Nomination - Essays and Reports, 9 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1-530 (1987). 
16. The first contemporary study of federal jurisdiction was instigated by Chief Justice War-
ren and focused on the proper division between the federal and state courts. It had little to say 
about federal appellate concerns, except that a reduction in original jurisdiction would result in 
fewer appeals. AMERICAN LAW INST. STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Official Draft 1969). Another report, published under the aus-
pices of the American Bar Association, focused on the burgeoning federal appellate caseloads. It 
suggested various efficiency reforms for handling appeals and posited sequential responses, in-
cluding creation of regional panels of the courts of appeals or subject matter appeals courts or 
some new national court. AM. B. FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED 
STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (1968). 
Chief Justice Burger did not specifically endorse the proposal for a new intermediate court 
until 1983. See Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 447 
(1983). And the proposal was but a small part of his broad effort to improve the administration 
of justice. See Gazell, Chief Justice Burger and the Administrative Side of Justice: A Retrospec-
tive, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 737 (1987); Tamm & Reardon, Warren E. Burger and the 
Administration of Justice, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 447. See also A Tribute To Chief Justice Warren 
E. Burger, 100 HARV. L. REv. 969-1001 (1987) (Tributes by William H. Rehnquist, Kenneth W. 
Starr, Alex Kozinski, John Edward Sexton, Mark W. Cannon, George E. MacKinnon). 
17. Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court, 51 F.R.D. 573 (1972) 
(Prepared for the Federal Judicial Center). Named after its chairman, Paul A. Freund, the com-
mittee was a group of jurists, scholars, and attorneys, and was commissioned by the Federal 
Judicial Center under the aegis of Chief Justice Burger. Its recommendations met with a hail-
storm of controversy. 
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called Hruska Commission proposed a national court of appeals with 
jurisdiction between the existing courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court.18 
Three other studies, not discussed by the authors, also have ana-
lyzed the problems of the federal court system. In liaison with the 
Federal Judicial Center and the National Center for State Courts, the 
Advisory Council on Appellate Justice conducted a four-year study. 
This council of judges, lawyers, and law professors in 1975 developed 
guidelines consistent with the Hruska Commission.19 The Action 
Commission to Reduce Court Costs and Delay, created in 1978 by the 
American Bar Association, recognized a federal court workload crisis 
and recommended immediate changes to increase appellate effi-
ciency. 20 And a committee within the Department of Justice, ap-
pointed by Attorney General Levi and chaired by Solicitor General 
Bork, issued a report in 1977 that emphasized the problems of the 
federal court system and recommended various reforms.21 
Study after study, committee after committee, has told us the chief 
needs of this generation for federal appeals are not being met.22 
Professors Estreicher and Sexton tell us that this is not so. The lesson 
they draw from this history "is that sweeping changes in the structure 
of the federal judiciary have not been forthcoming without a consensus 
among the Justices themselves and the scholarly and legal communi-
ties that a problem of sufficient magnitude exists" (p. 20). But there 
are additional reasons why federal court reform is difficult to accom-
plish. The Congress always has shown a separation-of-powers skepti-
cism toward proposals from the third branch and something of an 
agnosticism toward academic proposals for court reform. Court re-
form has no natural constituency beyond the judges themselves and, 
perhaps, a few motivated lawyers. Even a consensus that a problem 
exists coupled with agreement on the appropriate solution cannot en-
sure a prompt legislative response. Witness the longstanding consen-
sus that the Court's mandatory appellate jurisdiction should be 
abolished, a change not realized until 1988.23 The Evarts Act, creat-
18. See Commission on Revision of the Fed~ral Court Appellate System, Structure and In-
ternal Procedures: Recommendatz'onsfor Change, 67 F.R.D. 195, 237-47 (1975). An earlier re-
port had recommended various reforms for the courts of appeals. Commission on Revision of 
the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Boundaries of the Several Judicial Cir-
cuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973). 
19. See Meador, The Federal Judiciary - Inflation, Ma/function, and a Proposed Course of 
Action, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 617, 628-29. 
20. See Hufstedler & Nejelski, ABA Action Commission Challenges Litigation Cost and Delay, 
66 A.B.A. J. 965 (1980). . 
21. DEPT. OF JUSfICE COMM. ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYsrEM, THE 
NEEDS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS (1977). 
22. The literature is surveyed in Gazell, The National Coun of ;4.ppea~ Controversy: An 
Emerging Negative Consensus, 6 N. ILL. U: L. REV. 1 (1986). 
23. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100. 
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ing the circuit courts of appeals in 1891, was passed after a century of 
complaints about various features of the First Judiciary Act, and more 
than forty years after it was first proposed. 24 Once begun, Congress 
took another twenty years to complete the creation of an autonomous 
intermediate court.25 We should expect legislative consideration of 
structural reforms of the federal courts to be purposeful and deliber-
ate; and so it has been. Any implications by Professors Estreicher and 
Sexton that the proposal is dead or any suggestion by others that their 
study has killed it26 are, like Mark Twain's premature obituary, 
"greatly exaggerated." 
THE PRESENT DEBATE 
The authors next map the "Contours of the Present Debate" (p. 
31). They ably summarize the debate over the Freund Committee and 
Hruska Commission proposals, and they canvass the argumerits· over 
more recent permutations. They conclude, first, that proponents· of a 
new national court have "assumed without question the need for a 
new appellate court" and have merely focused on "details" such as 
whether the new court should be temporary or permanent and how it 
should be staffed and what jurisdictions it should be given (p. 31). 
Second, they criticize opponents of the latest proposal for offering the 
"same criticisms earlier advanced" against quite different proposals (p. 
31). 
Their first conclusion is, at best, inaccurate and, at worst, unfair. 
Proponents of a new national court have not merely "assum~d" that 
the Supreme Court has a workload problem; we have simply failed to 
convince Professors Estreicher and Sexton. During the 1928 Term, 
fifteen cases were filed each week; during the 1958 Term, thirty-five; 
during the 1970 Term, sixty-six; during the 1985 Term, eighty-five. It 
seems to me to lack grace to deny the public comments of all the cur-
rent Justices (except Justice Kennedy) who have expressed concern 
about growing workload. Nor do the authors find the work of other 
commentators persuasive.27 That Professors Estreicher and Sexton re-
24. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891). See CONG. GLOBE, 30th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 398-99 (1848). 
25. See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-475, 36 Stat. 1087. 
26. See pp. 25-31. See also Editorial, At Year'.\" End. Natl. L.J. Jan. 18, 1988 at 12 (urging 
Chief Justice Rehnquist to "drop this idea"); Kamen, National Appeals Court Appears to be Lost 
Cause, Wash. Post May 13, 1988 at A21 (calling it "an idea whose time has come and gone"). 
27. Thirty years ago, Professor Fowler V. Harper and four collaborators analyzed the 
Court's workload and concluded the Court had more work to do than it could do well. See 
Harper & Leibowitz, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1952 Term, 102 U. PA. L. 
REv. 427 (1954); Harper & Pratt, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do During the 1951 Term, 
101 U. PA. L. REv. 439 (1953); Harper & Etherington, What the Supreme Court Did Not Do 
During the 1950 Term, 100 U. PA. L. REV. 354 (1951); Harper & Rosenthal, What the Supreme 
Court Did Not Do in the 1949 Term: An Appraisal of Certiorari, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 293 (1950). 
Although there appear to me great similarities between the Harper efforts and the efforts of 
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main unconvinced is attributable to the fact that other commentators 
have not persuaded them, not that the others have not tried. My con-
cern is that the authors seem unpersuadable as they. dismiss each and 
every reasoned argument to the contrary. 
I could not agree· more with the authors' second conclusion. The 
opposition to the creation of a new national court has been character-
ized by a peculiar and frustrating dissonance. 28 Opponents say there is 
no "need" for a ri.ew court with such and such a feature, but they 
mean to say that they oppose only the particular feature.29 
. THE "MANAGERIAL" THEORY 
· Tlie heart. and soul of Redefining the Supreme Court's Role is 
found in the chapter entitled "A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court's Docket: Criteria for Case Selectibn" (pp. 41-70). Charging 
that "[w]riting and thinking about the Court is mark.ed by an unwill-
ingness or inability to resolve conflicting visions of the Court's.respon-
Professors Estreicher and Sexton, the latter two dismiss the former effort as lacking a "systematic 
framework" and as incomplete. Pp. 168-69 n.5. 
Professor Henry M. Hart prepared his famous time chart for the Justices to conclude "the 
Court has more work to do than it is able to do in the way in which the work ought to be done." 
Hart, The Supreme Court, 1958 Term -Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. 
REv. 84, (1959). The authors, however, choose to side With Justice Douglas' hastily considered 
and eccentric response and Thurmond Arnold's polemic against Hart. Douglas, The Supreme 
Court and Its Case Load, 45 CoRNELL L.Q. 401, 411 (1960). Arnold, Professor Hart's Theology, 
73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1310-14 (1960). See also Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term -
Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes-Professor Han and Judge Arnold, 74 HARV. L. REV- 81, 83-
86 (1960). 
My coauthor and I recently recalculated Professor Hart's figures on the Justices' work week 
to arrive at "9.6 hours on a six-day week, or more likely 8.2 hours daily on a seven-day work 
week." Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1401-02. See also id. at 1403 (estimates of the 
quantity of work for one Term totalling over 400,000 pages of materials and in excess of 800 
hours). One recent estimate is that the Court's cas~load and conference schedule now allows an 
average of six minutes at Conference for each case on the Discuss List and just under one-half 
hour for the consideration of each case granted plenary review. D. O'BRIEN, supra note 6, at 
231. Is it any wonder why Supreme Court Justices more and more resemble singers of "rounds," 
with a profusion of separate voices in concurring and dissenting opinions? E.g., Thornburg v. 
Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986). 
28. See Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1414-15. 
29. Then Circuit Judge Bork made the appropriate distinction in his explanation of his own 
conversion: 
I have been opposed to the concept of a National Court of Appeals siJJce I first studied 
the proposal in 1976. . 
That view, however, has been shaken. Members of the Supreme Court whose judgment 
I respect have endorsed the idea in very positive terms. They are certainly more familiar 
with the problem of inadequate national appellate capacity than I am. If they say there is a 
real problem, I cannot plausibly dispute their assertion. 
This has forced me to rethink my position and to ask how much of my dislike of the 
proposal stems from the basic concept and how much from the specific features of the pro-
posal now before you. Upon reflection, I think it is the specifics of the bill rather than the 
fundamental idea that trouble me. 
To Establish an Intercircuit Tribunal of the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Hearings on H.R. 4238 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1986) (prepared statement of Judge Robert H. 
Bork). 
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sibilities" (p. 41), Professors Estreicher and Sexton set out "to improve 
significantly upon the generalities of [Supreme Court] Rule 17," the 
Court's published standard of discretion. 30 They do so despite the 
warning by the acknowledged leading experts on Supreme Court pro-
cedural lore that "[a]ny attempt to restate these criteria with greater 
precision is somewhat temeritous"31 in light of the cautions by the 
Justices over the years that no rule could capture all the nuance in the 
exercise of this discretion to select cases. 
The authors begin with the heuristic assumption that the Court's 
jurisdiction should be wholly discretionary (p. 44). Further, they con-
veniently control for several complications by announcing their inten-
tion not to address them. Thus, they decline to weight cases for 
importance and time demand; they do not consider how the screening 
burden adds to the workload and takes away from the quality of deci-
sionmaking; they ignore the frequently expressed concern that the 
Court is unable to decide a sufficient proportion of cases to achieve a 
satisfactory coherence in federal law; they seemingly reject out of hand 
the announced perceptions by all the Justices that they have too much 
to do and the suggestion by some Justices that referring cases to a new 
national court would give the Court greater influence over the national 
law; and most important, they omit any implications for the caseload 
problems of the district courts and courts of appeals (pp. 45-46). 
What Professors Estreicher and Sexton do describe is their "mana-
gerial model" of the Supreme Court; properly viewed, the Court is the 
"manager of a system of courts involved in the development of sound, 
nationally binding federal law" (p. 49). This is not particularly upset-
ting, on first reading. Indeed, a "managerial perspective" admittedly 
is acceptable intuitively as being consistent with a host of principles in 
American constitutional history.32 But it is intuitively acceptable, in 
30. P. 43. Rule 17 provides, in part: 
A review on writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion, and will 
be granted only when there are special and important reasons therefor. The following, while 
neither controlling nor fully measuring the Court's discretion, indicate the character of rea-
sons that will be considered. 
(a) When a federal court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the decision 
of another federal court of appeals on the same matter; or has decided a federal question in a 
way in conflict with a state court oflast resort; or has so far departed from the accepted and 
usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, 
as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of supervision. 
{b) When a state court of last resort has decided a federal question in a way in conflict 
with the decision of another state court of last resort or of a federal court of appeals. 
(c) When a state court or a federal court of appeals has decided an important question of 
federal law which has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided a federal 
question in a way in conflict with applicable decisions of this Court. 
SUP. Cr. R. 17. 
31. P. 43. See R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN & s. SHAPIRO, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 195 
(6th ed. 1986) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT PRACTICE]. 
32. See Strauss, supra note 2, at 1097. One could broadly describe the Supreme Court's role 
as "defining and vindicating general constitutional rights, maintaining a reasonable degree of 
uniformity in federal law, and preserving the constitutional distribution of powers between the 
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part, because it is so indeterminate. Such a syncretism would deny 
Professors Estreicher and Sexton any meaning for their model, how-
ever, as it would encompass conflicting visions of the Court's responsi-
bilities. And I am certain that they do not mean for it to have that 
quality.33 This is their most grievous error. I do not care for their 
metaphor or its functional and structural implications. 
First, I resist the metaphor itself: the Court as a "wise manager" 
(p. 50). It may have the veneer of modernism and an interdisciplinary 
gloss, but I find it pseudoscientific and artificial. The Court's role is 
probably better described in poetry and art than in M.B.A. jargon. I 
would suggest to Professors Estreicher and Sexton that their efforts 
and the whole constitutional enterprise would be better off with fewer 
metaphors. Perhaps the problem is that no metaphor adequately cap-
tures the essential role of the Court. 34 Eschewing metaphors, Profes-
sor Herbert Wechsler, a great student of the Court, once described 
"our highest court" as 
the tribunal that is certainly without an analogue throughout the world 
in the magnitude of its responsibilities, measured by the difficulty and 
importance of the issues it confronts, the finality of many of its most 
transforming judgments short of constitutional amendment, the number 
of judicial systems from which cases on its docket may derive and the 
complexity of the mixed legal system in the ordering of which it has the 
final voice. 35 
More important, the functional implications of the managerial 
metaphor are unsettling. The Supreme Court of Professors Estreicher 
and Sexton eclipses even the role of legislature and becomes the signal 
institution for planning and managing public policy. The authors, in 
effect, finesse away the richness of the contemporary debate over the 
proper role for the judiciary in the separation of powers with their 
managerial metaphor. 
The prin~iple of federalism provides another functional vantage on 
the changing role of the Supreme Court and the rest of the federal 
courts that the authors overlook. Given the narrow focus of their 
book, perhaps this oversight may not be faulted. Recent debate, how-
ever, raises several far-ranging questions. What are the contending 
views on the role of the states in the federal system? Have the three 
branches of the federal government honored federalism? Has the 
Supreme Court performed its proper institutional role regarding the 
States? Have the lower federal courts performed their proper institu-
states and the national government and among the three coordinate federal branches." Baker & 
McFarland, supra note 2, at 1405. 
33. Seep. 41. 
34. See Powell, Constitutional Metaphors, THE NEW REPUBLIC 314 (Feb. 11, 1925) (Review-
ing J. BECK, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1925)). 
35. Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law and 
the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1043, 1043 (1977). 
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tional role regarding the states? How have the federal courts affected 
state sovereignty? At least, I think I may fairly criticize the authors 
for ignoring the interrelatedness of the Supreme Court and the state 
judiciaries. 36 
Alarms go off in my head when I read Professors Estreicher and 
Sexton's Freudian references to the Court's "agenda." My chief con-
cern is that functional limits in separation of powers and federalism 
are left behind as one begins to think that the Supreme Court no 
longer is a federal court - and need not act as a court or only in the 
federal sphere - arid begins to think about managing an "agenda." 
My final criticism of the managerial model is also structural and 
relates to the Supreme Court's proper role in maintaining uniformity 
in federal law - the problem of conflicts. Professors Estreicher and 
Sexton emphasize a "presumption of regnlarity" to be accorded deci-
sions of federal and state appellate courts (p. 50). Their assumption, 
the current certiorari assumption, is that it is proper to grant Supreme 
Court review in few cases. This places a special responsibility on the 
lower courts which, as a practical matter, would finally decide most 
cases. Although Professors Estreicher and Sexton say their model '!is 
prepared to take seriously [the Court's] responsibility to resolve con-
flicts" (p. 54), their further elaboration belies it. They unremarkably 
argue that the Court need not "act to eradicate disuniformity as soon 
as it appears" (p. 48), but quite remarkably go on to contend that 
disuniformity, at least in the short run, may be tolerable and perhaps 
beneficial. It may be that such disuniformity was an unintended by-
product of a geographically dispersed, decentralized judicial structure; 
but it is a feature that has endured, we submit, because the system's 
commitment to uniformity is qualified by a policy in favor of intercircuit 
experimentation. Disagreement iti the lower courts facilitates percola-
tion - the independent evaluation of a legal issue by different courts. 
The process of percolation allows a period of exploratory consideration 
and experimentation by lower courts before the Supreme Court ends the 
process with a nationally binding rule.37 
0 Nonsense. 
Intercircuit conflicts may be inevitable given our court structure, 
but they are an evil nonetheless. 38 Uniformity in matters of a federal 
36. The authors give disappointingly short shrift to the fifty state court systems and their 
complex relation with the federal courts - a single paragraph of less than 200 words. P. 135. 
This is remarkable given the profound tensions for federalism in these relations. See, e.g., S. 
FINO, THE ROLE OF THE STATE SUPREME COURT IN THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1987). 
They deal with the issue of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in a wholly 
unsatisfactory manner. Unaccountably, they ignore the most recent in a long line of cases, the 
landmark opinion in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), which revamped the methodology 
for deciding whether to remand such cases to the state court. Long was decided just before the 
N. Y. U. Law Review study was published, but well before this book. 
37. P. 48 (footnote omitted). 
38. See generally Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1404-09. 
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law has been the overriding policy since the drafting of the Supremacy 
Clause39 and the creation of a role for one Supreme Court. 40 A policy 
of uniformity undergirded the unpopular but long surviving require-
ment that Justices ride circuit,41 the last remnant of which is the cur-
rent practice of designating a Circuit Justice.42 It was uniformity, in 
large part, that compelled the Court to uphold the constitutionality of 
its authority to review state decisions.43 A concern for uniformity per-
suaded Congress to expand .the jurisdictional statute. of the Supreme 
Court in 1914, the single such expansion in history.44 And the Judges' 
Bill of 1925 was deemed a measure to allow the ·Court to achieve 
greater uniformity.4s · 
Additionally, there is a growing number of conflicts resulting from 
two contemporary characteristics of the circuit courts. First, the indi-
vidual courts of appeals have developed an artificial autonomy in their 
stare decisis. 46 When created in 1891, the coux:ts ofappeals were to 
function "to correct individual injustice and control erroneous or law-
less behavior by judges or other officials.·; .. "47 Soon their dockets 
exceeded their capacities, and Congress responded by adding judges. 
As the number of judges grew, more permutations of three-judge 
panels became possible. This threatened the institutional values of 
uniformity among panel decisions and majority control over the law of 
the circuit. The first mechanism for preserving these values was the en 
bane rehearing before all the active judges. En bane rehearings proved 
inefficient, however, as they resulted in cumbersome delay and expense 
for the litigants and consumed scarce judicial resources.48 The rule of 
39. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (A. Hamilton). 
40. At the Philadelphia Convention, John Rutledge articulated the consensus reason for the 
establishment of one supreme national court: "to secure the national rights and uniformity of 
Judgments." Quoted in Vinson, Work of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12 TEXAS B.J. 551, 551-52 
(1949). 
41. See generally Baker, Precedent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 
Sw. L.J. 687, 689-94 (1981). 
42. 28 u.s.c. § 42 (1982). 
43. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347-48 (1816); see also Murdock v. 
City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 631-32 (1874). 
44. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. 
45. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936. 
46. See Baker, supra note 41, at 720-23. 
47. JUSTICE ON APPEAL supra note 10, at 200. 
48. Recognizing the problems with en bane rehearings, Professors Estreicher and Sexton 
later in the book suggest a number of alternate approaches to police circuit panels. One is requir-
ing publication of an opinion in each appeal on rehearing in which a party claims the panel did 
not follow circuit precedent. P. 133. A second is a rule that rehearings be conducted by a panel 
different from the one that originally decided the appeal, p. 134, and a third would require the 
panel to circulate a draft opinion to the parties for comment. P. 135. The first suggestion is 
naive. Requiring an opinion that says the panel followed precedent will not ensure that it did. 
See Baker, supra note 6, at 246-56. Published written opinions on the merits assure the litigants 
and the public that the decision is the result of reasoned judgment and not mere fiat. Second 
opinions on rehearing add marginally, if at all, to these purposes. The second suggestion is 
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interpanel accord, a variant of stare decisis, developed and grew in 
prominence as an alternative to preserve those two institutional values. 
Sometimes referred to as the "law of the circuit," this rule obliges a 
three-judge panel to treat earlier panel decisions as binding absent in-
tervening en bane or Supreme Court considerations. Decisions of 
other courts of appeals, by contrast, are deemed merely persuasive. 
As a result, parallel and independent hierarchies of precedent have 
developed for each circuit. This ersatz independence raises the poten-
tial for conflicting decisions among the circuits. 
Although the policy of one national law is preserved, at least in 
theory, by the supervisory or "managerial" power of the Supreme 
Court over the courts of appeals, docket growth creates the realistic 
likelihood for conflicts. The real villain is the docket growth at the 
intermediate level.49 The number of appeals has increased nearly ten-
fold in the last three decades, from 3,713 in 1960 to 35,700 in 1987.50 
Congress has more than doubled the number of circuit judges,51 
though judgeships have not kept pace with increased filings. 
All those federal appellate decisions from all those federal appel-
late judges, along with the countless decisions on federal law by the 
highest courts in the fifty states, are reviewable, if at all, by only one 
Supreme Court of nine Justices. As recently as 1924, the Supreme 
Court reviewed about one in ten decisions of the courts of appeals. 
Twenty-five years ago, the rate had dropped to between 2% and 3%, 
in recent years the rate has dwindled to less than 1%.52 As then-Jus-
tice Rehnquist observed: 
The Court cannot review a sufficiently significant portion of the decisions 
of any federal court of appeals to maintain the supervisory authority that 
it maintained over the federal courts fifty years ago; it simply is not able 
or willing, given the other constraints upon its time, to review all the 
decisions that result in a conflict in the applicability of federal law.53 
In recent Terms, intercircuit conflicts have comprised approxi-
inefficient. Having a second panel review petitions for rehearing might not add much administra· 
tive work, but the rehearing panel still would have to evaluate unfamiliar issues on an unfamiliar 
record, adding to an already burdensome workload. The third suggestion is oblivious to the 
circuit reality. Circulating opinions to the parties for comment, a technique tried in the District 
of Columbia Circuit, see Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, superseded in 636 F.2d 
323, 343-44 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Leventhal, J.), obliges a kind of petition for panel rehearing in 
every case without regard to appropriateness and thus is overinclusive. It prolongs the appeal, 
increases costs, and wastes already scarce judicial resources. 
49. See generally Baker, supra note 6, at 234-38. 
50. DIR. OF THE ADMIN. OFC. OF THE UNITED STATES CTs., 1960 ANN. REP. 3; see also 
ADMIN. 0FC. OF THE UNITED STATES CTs., FEDERAL JUDICIAL WORKLOAD STATISTICS I 
(1987). 
51. See Act of May 19, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-36, 75 Stat. 80 (1961); Bankruptcy Amend· 
ments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 201, 98 Stat. 333, 346 (1984). 
52. Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1405-06. 
53. Rehnquist, A Plea/or Help: Solutions to Serious Problems Currently Experienced by the 
Federal Judicial System, 28 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1, 4-5 (1984). 
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mately 5% of the entire docket and about one-third of the signed opin-
ions. This suggests a certain priority being given to conflict resolution, 
as would be expected. Justice White recently has endeavored to leave 
a trail of unresolved conflicts in the U.S. Reports by dissenting from 
the denial of certiorari when the case presents an unresolved conflict.54 
By my count, there were fifty-four such dissents by Justice White in 
the 1984 Term, forty in 1985, seventeen in 1986, and twenty-seven in 
1987. Some studies of the Supreme Court docket find fewer, some find 
more. 55 The point is that conflicts in national law are accumulating. 
Justice White has best described the mischief of unresolved 
conflicts: 
[D]enying review of decisions that conflict with other decisions of 
Courts of Appeals o[r] State Supreme Courts results in the federal law 
being enforced differently in different parts of the country. What is a 
crime, an unfair labor practice or an unreasonable search and seizure in 
one place is not a crime, unfair practice or illegal search in another juris-
diction. Or citizens in one circuit do not pay the same taxes that those in 
other circuits must pay. . . . And this is to say nothing of those cases 
involving no conflict but obviously important statutory or constitutional 
issues that warrant authoritative review. 56 
This creates an incentive to engage in forum shopping and "races to 
the courthouse"57 and to refuse to acquiesce in the first court's adverse 
ruling in the hope that another court's subsequent ruling will be 
favorable. My favorite example is the controversial and complex issue 
whether the U.S. Postal Service is immune from state court garnish-
ment proceedings. Before the Supreme Court finally decided the issue, 
the government had urged its view twenty times in district courts and 
54. See generally Varat, Justice White and the Breadth and Allocation of Federal Authority, 
58 U. COLO. L. REv. 371 (1987); Note, The Intercircuit Tribunal and Perceived Conflicts: An 
Analysis of Justice White's Dissents from Denial of Certiorari During the 1985 Term, 62 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 610 (1987). 
55. See L. BECK, INTER-CIRCUIT CoNFLICIS AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES: A STUDY OF THE 1984 TERM (Feb. 1986) (unpublished manuscript available in the 
Office of the Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice). 
There are only estimates of the conflicts on the dockets of the courts of appeals. A 1982 
study of one of the twelve regional circuits estimated that ninety decisions of that single court 
that year were in conflict with another court of appeals and of that number thirty-six created a 
first-time conflict. See Hearings on H.R. 1968 and H.R. 1970 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, 
Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 170 (1983) (Statement of Chief Judge Godbold). Multiplying that number by some factor 
of twelve and adding some number from an even more removed speculation for the 50 state 
supreme courts suggests that there are a large number of decisions in conflict with other decisions 
which never make it into the United States Reports, even for a "cert. denied." Just how many, I 
am unwilling even to guess. 
56. Establishing an Intercircuit Panel: Hearings on S. 704 Before the Subcomm. on Courts of 
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 147-48 (1985) (pr~pared statement of A. 
Leo Levin quoting Justice White). 
57. See Selection of Court for Multiple Appeals Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-236, 1988 U.S. 
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (101Stat.)1731 (to be codified at 28 u.s.c. § 2112). 
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eight times in different courts of appeals. 58 
Beyond the inefficiencies in percolation, I simply do not believe the 
authors' rationalization that somehow a better decision will emerge 
when the Supreme Court waits for two courts to decide the same issue 
of federal law differently. Horizontal conflicts between different cir-
cuits, rather than a "policy" for intercircuit experimentation, are the 
result of a design defect in the federal system and of imperfect mecha-
nisms to achieve one law of the circuit. Furthermore, the circuits are 
not appropriate laboratories. Their "boundaries are quite arbitrary, 
the product of historical accident."59 Theirs is a false sovereignty, an 
autonomy of happenstance and convenience. 
If Professors Estreicher and Sexton mean to compare the circuits 
to the state courts, they are fundamentally incorrect. The states' ex-
perimental role - following the familiar federalism canard that likens 
states and state courts to laboratories of policy60 is in the exercise of 
their police power, however, not in federal constitutional law or fed-
eral statutory law. And the state courts are courts of general sover-
eigns worthy of deference under our system of federalism. The 
circuits, mere creatures of statute by comparison, are profoundly infer-
ior experimenters vis-a-vis each other. One could argue that when a 
state court is in a conflict with a lower federal court on an issue of 
federal law - what might be called a horizontal mixed conflict - the 
federalism tension between state sovereignty and national supremacy 
makes a strong claim for Supreme Court resolution. And when an 
inferior federal court or a state court does break rank to conflict with a 
Supreme Court precedent - creating a vertical conflict - the claim is 
equally strong. I do not question that federal questions and federal 
rights are appropriately decided in state courts and inferior federal 
courts. 61 The difference between Professors Estreicher and Sexton and 
myself may be in our expectations - or visions - of how prominent 
the Supreme Court ought to be in performing the essential, unique role 
as final arbiter of federal law. 
58. Franchise Tax Bd. v. United States Postal Serv., 467 U.S. 512, 519 n.12 (1984). See 
generally Levin & Leeson, Issue Preclusion Against the United States Government, 10 low A L. 
REV, 113, 128-29 (1984). . 
59. Baker,' supra note·6, at 282. See also Baker, supra note 41, at 736-39 (chronological 
table). 
60.·See, e.g., New State Ice a>. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing); Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312i 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
61. Indeed, a strong argument could be made that when a state court varies the federal law a 
concern for the principle of the supremacy clause dominates any concern for experimentation-
uniformity. "Supremacy conflicts directly implicate questions of federalism - the tension be-
tween state sqvereignty and national supremacy - and present a challenge to the constitutional 
role of the Supreme Court far greater than that posed by the de facto lawmaking power of the 
federal courts of appeal." Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1408 (footnote omitted). See also 
Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The Need for Additional 
Appellate Capacity, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 943 (1976); Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Jntercir-
cuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913 (1983). 
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Ultimately, I cannot accept the underlying premise of percolation. 
I believe that "[t]he framers of the Constitution and the drafters of 
federal statutes did not intend that our national law have 'more varia-
tions than we have time zones.' "62 Chief Justice Rehnquist illustrated 
the artificiality and absurdity of such an exaggerated circuit sover-
eignty with a practical geography lesson: "We are thus reduced to a 
situation where the statutes of the United States µiay mean one thing 
in Kansas City, Kansas, and another thing in neighboring Kansas 
City, Missouri; where the statutes mean one thing on the Vermont side 
of the Connecticut River and another thing on the New Hampshire 
side.''63 Conflicts that go unresolved are hurtful to the inherent nature 
of a national law. 
DISCRETIONARY CASE SELECTION 
The authors give substance to their managerial metaphor in the · 
form of a new version of Supreme Court Rule 17, or what might be 
described as "Supreme Court jurisdiction according to Professors Es-
treicher and Sexton.'' Like Caesar did Gaul, the authors divide the 
Court's docket into three parts: "the kinds of cases the Court ordina-
rily should hear, the kinds of cases it may hear, and the kinds of cases 
it ordinarily should not hear" (p. 44). The authors label these, respec-
tively, the priority docket, the discretionary docket, and the improvi-
dent grant segment. Their terminology is modern. Their logic and 
reasoning is sound. I had a distinct feeling of deja vu, however, being 
reminded of the existing scheme of statutes and court rules. 64 Their 
proposal is characterized by discretion in each category and its 
strength lies in its realistic view of the current system of case selection. 
The "priority docket" consists of cases that require an immediate 
and definitive resolution, irrespective of the substantive issue (pp. 52-
53). These include cases involving "intoleraple intercourt conflicts," 
"conflicts with Supreme Court pn;cedent," "profound vertical federal-
ism disputes," "interbranch disputes," and "interstate disputes" (pp. 
53-62). The last two categories are self-evident. ·Disputes between two 
sta~es come within the Court's current exclusive and original jurisdic-
tion, 65 and invalidation of a federal statute or an exec~tive order until 
recently came within the Court's appeal jurisdiction. 66 "Profound ver-
tical federalism disputes," for the most part, consist of federal court 
62. Baker & McFarland, supra note 2, at 1408 (quoting W. BURGER, 1985 YEAR-END RE-
PORT ON THE JUDICIARY 13). 
63. Remarks of the Chief Justice at _the 64th Annual American Law Institute Meeting 6 
(May 19, 1987). 
64. See, e.g., P. BREST & s. LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISJONMAKING 
- CASES AND MATERIALS 1381-90 (2d ed. 1983). . 
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1982): 
66. 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1982), repealed by Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. 
L. No. 100-352, 1988 U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 l)tat.) 662. The authors have no 
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invalidation of state or local statutes and state court invalidation of 
federal action. Both categories until recently were covered by "appeal 
as of right" statutes. 67 When a lower federal court or state court has 
disregarded a controlling and authoritative Supreme Court precedent, 
the case requires review, according to the authors and current prac-
tice. 68 The au~hors' category "intolerable intercircuit conflicts" needs 
further elaboration (pp. 53-59). Cases in this category become "square 
conflicts" only when the courts in one jurisdiction (federal circuit or 
state) are bound by a legal rule contrary to another jurisdiction; sum-
mary actions, dicta, and alternative holdings do not count (p. 54). 
"Square conflicts" become, in tum, "intolerable" when they are ex-
ploitable by forum shoppers or when they frustrate those who are sub-
ject to multiple jurisdictions, such as national companies (p. 57). Still, 
the issue becomes a priority only "when the marginal costs of contin-
ued disuniformity in the legal standard exceed the marginal benefits of 
additional percolation" (pp. 57-58). If this is an improvement over 
Rule 17, I am missing something. The authors provide some "rules of 
thumb": "square conflicts" that allow forum shopping or create plan-
ning difficulty, and three-court conflicts, have priority. Although the 
authors upgrade "intolerable conflicts" cases that meet their rule of 
thumb from the current Rule 17 discretion to the highest priority, 
their priority docket remarkably resembles the appellate jurisdiction in 
the statutes that portrayed the Court's role when the book was writ-
ten: "When the division of powers among the branches of the federal 
government, between federal and state governments, or between states 
is threatened by a lower court ruling, the Court's role as arbiter - its 
unique ability to render a decisive resolution - is called into play" (p. 
53). 
Discretionary review, according to the authors, "need not be arbi-
trary" (p. 62). They list guidelines (pp. 62-69) for their discretion-
ary docket highly reminiscent of the current state of the certiorari 
art: "suspicion of the forum's consideration of a federal question";69 
"considerations of vertical federalism" that "press for Supreme 
Court review";70 "significant interference with federal executive re-
quarrel with the Court's historical willingness to decide inter-branch disputes. E.g., United 
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
67. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254(2) & 1257(1) (1982), repealed and modified by Supreme Court Case 
Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 
Stat.) 662. 
68. See, e.g., Jaffree v. Board of School Commrs., 554 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Ala.), modified 
705 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir. 1983), a./fd., 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
69. P. 62 (emphasis added). When a state court sustains a state action against a federal 
constitutional or statutory challenge, until recently the matter was appealable. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1257(2) (1982), amended by Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 
U.S. CoDE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS (102 STAT.) 662. 
70. P. 63 (emphasis added). 
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sponsibility"; 71 "exercise of the Court's extraordinary power of super-
vision"; 72 "resolution of a national emergency";73 and "vehicles for 
advances in the development of federal law."74 Professors Estreicher 
and Sexton have substituted these categories, their weasel words in my 
italics, for the indefinite and more general Rule 17 now on the books. 
The authors fall prey to the very vision of the Court they earlier criti-
cized, for in two of the guidelines - considerations of vertical federal-
ism ("involving a major departure from Supreme Court precedent or a 
plainly erroneous extension of doctrine" (p. 63)) and the extraordinary 
power of supervision ("occasional review of egregious error in order to 
ensure responsible actions by lower courts" (p. 64)) - they evidently 
succumb to the inevitable pressure the Court feels to perform selec-
tively as a court of errors. 75 Indeed, the Court often has answered 
prophecies of dire consequences with Justice Holmes' rejoinder not 
"while this Court sits," to invoke the constitutional in terrorem of ju-
dicial review reserved for the rare occasion. 76 
The third division of the Court's docket on those cases in which 
review is "improvident" (pp. 69-70). Given their self described "ex-
haustive and generous" priority and discretionary categories, they la-
bel anything else improvident, including, but not limited to: two-court 
conflicts; nonconstitutional federal questions decided by a federal 
court; questions of state law; state court invalidations of a state action 
on a federal ground; and mere errors, even constitutional errors. 
Resistance to review of such cases is aspirational; the authors concede 
"some inappropriate grants are bound to occur" (p. 70). Their argu-
ment, however, is that if the number of improvident grants exceeds the 
number of priority cases denied review, then those who complain 
71. P. 63 (emphasis added). The interference must be "significant"; the federal action must 
be "important." The authors urge a two-court conflict rule of thumb. Pp. 63-64. 
72. P. 64 (emphasis added). 
73. P. 64 (emphasis added). This describes current practice. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
74. P. 65 (emphasis added). "Vehicles" come in several models: "prior reservation of the 
issue or prior fractionated ruling;" "doctrinal incoherence;" "overruling precedent;" review of 
cases related to other cases granted review by priority or by discretion; "review of court of exclu-
sive jurisdiction;" and "application of settled Supreme Court precedent to_ situations presenting a 
risk of serious dislocation." Pp. 65-68. Again, the authors seem to describe the current ap-
proach. See pp. 65-69 nn. 50-57. Notably, they do part company with the Court over grants on 
the basis of "serious economic dislocation,'' p. 68, cf. Pennzoil & Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. 1 
(1987); election procedures cases, p. 68, cf. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); and, "with 
some disquiet," death penalty cases, p. 69, Cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987). 
75. See supra text accompanying note 13. Later, in applying their criteria, the authors take a 
more pragmatic view of the need for uniformity in the national law to conclude "[w]here the 
percolation process has resulted in doctrinal incoherence, the Court need not await a square 
conflict to review a ruling that is' difficult to reconcile with Supreme Court doctrine." P. 88. 
76. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel Knox, 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting). E.g., Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 686 (1972); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 127 
(1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
1490 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 87:1472 
about the Supreme Court workload and unresolved conflicts should 
lose the debate over the need for a new national court (p. 70). 
While I necessarily have omitted many of the nuances and qualifi-
cations, I have tried not to be unfair in my summary of the authors' 
model. As for a critique, Professors Estreicher and Sexton have de-
voted their own separate chapter to "Probable Criticisms of the Crite-
ria" (pp. 71-75). 
Their first listed self-criticism is that the managerial model is at 
odds with what the authors might call the "quaint" vision of the 
Supreme Court as a judicial body. Traditionally, a denial of review, 
under the Rule ofFour,77 has meant only that the Court does not have 
the capacity to hear the case. The authors would reinterpret a denial 
to mean that the Justices have determined that review is "premature" 
before adequate percolation.78 Second, the authors anticipate a criti-
cism that they have "understated the importance of uniformity in fed.,. 
eral law" (p. 72). I already have made my pitch for greater 
uniformity. The tendency toward geographical dispersion of the na-
tional law, constitutional and statutory, is worrisome to me and I disa-
gree with the authors' notion that it is something to be encouraged. 
Most significantly overlooked is that in the modem administrative 
state, sending conflicting messages from courts to administrative agen-
cies "appears truly destructive to the ideal of agency obedience to law 
expressed in the hierarchical relationship between agencies and 
courts. "79 Third, the authors admit to vulnerability to the challenge 
that their priority docket is underinclusive and does not adequately 
emphasize the Court's role to define and vindicate constitutional rights 
(p. 72). They rightly respond that their discretionary docket is flexible 
and adequate. However, they would have been more straightforward 
had they given the same content to the "important issue" basis for 
grants that they have given to the conflict basis. Perhaps this is a con-
cession that "importance" is so discretionary as to be left inevitably to 
the will of four Justices no matter what is announced as a standard. 
Fourth, they suggest that a critic might complain that they have 
"overstated the benefits of percolation" (p. 73). I agree that the choice 
today is not between the Supreme Court hearing every case or hearing 
just some. That choice was made in 1925. The current choice is be-
tween the inadequate capacity for uniformity and coherence and the 
promise of some proposed structural reform. I am convinced my side 
77. See Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1983). 
78. P. 72. I am wary of too elaborate a system of appellate writs that would introduce unnec-
essary complexity and ambiguity with little other purpose. See generally Simpson, Notations 
Used on Applications for Writs of Error, 12 TEXAS B.J. 547 (1949). 
79. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1110. "Varying instructions from different courts of appeals not 
only interfere with the instruction to achieve uniformity, but also make it more difficult for the 
agency to manage its own resources and to guide and motivate the enormous bureaucracy for 
which it is responsible." Id. at 1112 (footnote omitted). 
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has the better arguments in favor of a new intermediate court; I am 
unconvinced by their judo-like logic that identifies a weakness in the 
current structure and turns it into a strength to resist reform. Fifth, 
the authors rightly dismiss anticipated criticisms that their suggested 
reforms are too difficult to implement or unlikely to be implemented, 
since, they say, such nay-saying "dooms most proposals for reform" 
(p. 74) - including the proposal to create a riew national court. 
A further apology is against the charge that their docket criteria 
are "hopelessly presumptuous" (p. 75). Their cogent argument is that 
the criteria for case selection should not remain wholly indeterminate. 
That is not presumptuous. It is somewhat presumptuous, however, 
for the authors to announce that "the only ,constructive way,to criti-
cize our criteria is ... to develop alternative ones" (p. 74). I happen to 
find my own critique constructive. 
To their prescient list of probable criticisms I add a few of my own. 
I do find it somewhat presumptuous to dismiss 200 years of thoughtfui 
reflection on the role of the Supreme Court by calling for. a "new vi-
sion" reminiscent of a Madison A venue advertising agency campaign 
on behalf of some "new and improved" product. I find it somewhat 
presumptuous to pretend to write on a tabula rasa so far as discretion-
ary jurisdiction is concerned. There is much accumulated wisdom of 
jurists and scholars on the subject, all of which is left begging by the 
authors' hubris to construct an original and elaborate docket model. 80 
There is another, far more serious shortcoming of their model. Like 
so many products today, "new and improved" is a claim on the box 
that is not supported by the contents. The authors' unconscious virtue 
is that apparently they have internalized the structure of the leading 
treatise on Supreme Court practice. 81 Their vice is that they seem to 
expect to receive the mantle of radical reformers. The point is not lost 
that their model, or any model including the actual current practice, 
must proceed on a case-by-case basis and must be characterized by 
broad categories, flexible concepts, and loose definitions. I conclude 
that Professors Estreicher and Sexton's model is more descriptive and 
less prescriptive than they are willing to admit. 
The authors' claim to originality may rest chiefly on their con-
flicts/percolation discussion and their so-called "rules of thumb'." The 
failing there is their artificial quantitative approach required by a qual-
itative failure to define importance as a criteria for grants. I have no 
quarrel with a two-court-conflict or three-court-conflict rule, so long 
80. E.g., D. PROVINE, CASE SELEcnON IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT (1980); 
Tanenhaus, Schick, Muraskin & Rosen, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue The-
ory, in JUDICIAL DECISIONMAKING 111 (G. Shubert ed. 1963). See also HART & WECHSLER, 
supra note 2, at 1855-78; SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 31. 
81. SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 31. To say later that "the Supreme Court bar 
does not perceive any normative set of principles guiding case selection (and hence does not 
frame argument within any such context)," is to blink at these 1030 pages in the sixth edition. 
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as it is recognized that the importance of the issue in conflict is being 
ignored. We could just as well agree that conflicts between odd-num-
bered circuits should be reviewed but not those between even-num-
bered circuits. Why not? 
It has been said of gifted advocates that they are capable of 
presenting the opposing arguments more persuasively than their oppo-
nent as they make their case. Would that I were a better advocate to 
do for the authors' side of the debate what they have done for mine. 
THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
"The Criteria Applied" (pp. 76-103) is the most impressive chapter 
of the book. There the authors detail their empirical examination of 
the Court's workload during the October Term 1982. During that 
Term, the authors note, several Justices expressed concerns over work-
load and, therefore, would have approached case selection sensitively 
and cautiously. 82 The professors examined only the grants themselves; 
their students examined the 1860 paid cases denied review. They re-
viewed the complete certiorari file and evaluated lower court opinions 
for conflicts. They found nearly one-half priority cases (78, or 48%), 
more than one-fourth discretionary cases (47, or 28%), and about one-
fourth improvident grants (39, or 24%) (p. 81). The high incidence of 
intercourt conflicts among the cases given plenary review (42%) con-
firms that conflict resolution is a high priority for the Justices (p. 85). 
The authors provide a painstakingly detailed description of their as-
sessments of the three categories complete with tables and appendices. 
They explain their categorization of each and every case with a com-
pleteness that honestly impressed and intimidated this reader. 
Most significant was their determination that about one-fourth of 
the grants were classifiable as "improvident." The authors blame the 
then existing mandatory jurisdiction, hasty review of state court inval-
idations, undue deference to the Solicitor General, and premature res-
olution of conflicts, among other reasons (pp. 91-110). Mere error 
correction, however, did not account for a large number of improvi-
dent grants (8, or 21%).83 This seems to confirm my accusation that 
the authors rail against error correction as some kind of bogeyman, 
even though they somewhat sheepishly explain that, "[i]t is difficult to 
say anything conclusive about the error-correction thesis from this 
type of gross numerical comparison."84 Accepting the characteriza-
tion of improvident grants, the authors conclude there is additional 
capacity currently available to the Court (pp. 101-02): among the 
82. P. 77. The authors also admit the possibility that O.T. 1982 was atypical and challenge 
readers to verify their criteria for other Terms. Pp. 77-78. 
83. P. 98. They suspect their figures to understate the problem. P. 99. 
84. P. 99. Some of their illustrative improvident grants are, at least, arguable examples of 
their criteria. 
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1860 cases denied review, the student assistants found only twelve in-
tolerable conflicts and nineteen total conflicts (pp. 102-03). 
When I read this book, I was grading my semester examinations in 
Constitutional Law. If Professors Estreicher and Sexton were to re-
grade my students' papers, I suppose they would grade some higher 
and some lower, and most about the same. That is similar to the per-
formance rating their study gave the Supreme Court: During the 1982 
Term, some grants should not have been granted; some denials should 
not have been denied; and most grants and most denials were proper. 
The authors' case for a serious overgranting problem depends on elab-
orate statistical breakdowns with tables analyzing their own theoreti-
cal construct of the Court's docket. Yet their conclusion is rather 
simple: they found thirty-nine cases they would not have granted re-
view, and their students found only twelve, at most nineteen, cases 
improperly denied review. 85 My own armchair reaction to their statis-
tics is that the Court's plus-or-minus factor of twenty cases out of a 
docket of more than 5000 is quite impressive, even remarkable. There 
is little room for improvement. Giventhe nature ofthe case selection 
process, if only 10% of the roughly 200 cases granted review are con-
troverted grants, I still give the Court an "A." As a scholar who eval-
uated various studies of the certiorari procedure observed; "The 
decisions that ar~ made, not surprisingly, sometimes fail to satisfy the 
outside academic commentator, but there is no alternative to some 
human process, inevitably subjective, sifting the applications down to 
a manageable size."86 
Case selection is a necessary and important function. It is also 
time consuming. Through the years of docket growth the Justices 
have reduced their personal time and attention to ~ach petition. Once 
upon a time, every case was discusseq. Then the Chief Justice kept a 
list of "dead cases," which required no discussion, although any Jus-
tice could remove a petition from the list. Today, the Chief Justice 
maintains a "discuss list" to which any Justice can add a petition, the 
operative assumption being for denial of review. In recent years, six 
Justices have participated in a "cert pool" in which law clerks share 
the duty to draft memoranda on ten to twenty discuss-list cases out of 
approximately 100 cases docketed each week. This account of the case 
selection process is the basis of the authors' speculation on the avoida-
ble causes of overgranting: a lack of particularized criteria and the 
Court's internal screening procedures themselves. 
The authors conclude that a major cause of avoidable overgranting 
is the "hopelessly indeterminate and unilluminating" standard in Rule 
85. The authors were careful not to vouch for the law students' independent screening in 
every case. P. 182 n.98. 
86. R. HODDER-WILLIAMS, THE PoLmcs OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 67 (1980) (cita-
tions omitted). 
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17 · which breeds subjectivity (p: 106). To me, this subjectivity is a 
virtue of the system. I am not sure why else we nominate and confirm 
and provide life tenure for Justices if not for their best individual judg-
ment. Contrary to the authors' naivete, I believe that the case selec-
tion process is, and should be, as much a political process as decisions 
on the merits. 87 How is it untoward for some Justices to ·~oin three" 
to vote for review because of the nature of the case or the influence of a 
colleague (p. 107)? Is it a surprise that lack of a dominant philosophy 
allows for grants by free-forming coalitions (p. 107)? Should we not 
expect more grants from the Court if its philosophy is at variance with 
the courts being reviewed (p. 107)? By comparing Rule 17 with their 
criteria, the authors anticipated my own conclusion: "Even were the 
Justices wholeheartedly to endorse [the] criteria, nine Justices operat-
ing on a Rule of Four are bound to produce an application of the 
criteria at variance with the results of [the] study" (p. 108). 
A NEW NATIONAL COURT AND OTHER REFORMS 
In an altogether too brief chapter, entitled "Unsuitable Remedies: 
The Proposals for a New Appellate Court," (pp. 111-15) the authors 
argue that a new national court would not address any of their specu-
lated causes for overgranting and would add problems of its own. It is 
almost as if Professors Estreicher and Sexton believe that their forego-
ing analysis is fatal to the proposal for a new intermediate court and 
they offer us this chapter as an epitaph. There is not much wrong with 
their five pages that has not been explained already elsewhere in this 
review. 
First and foremost, the authors are guilty of the kind of dissonance 
I complained about above. 88 They blur the important distinction be-
tween the issue whether there is a need for a new national court and 
with the debate over the form and jurisdiction of such a court. 
The authors are correct to suggest that creating the opportunity to 
refer a case to the new court would further complicate Supreme Court 
screening, which today is limited to choosing to grant or to deny re-
view (pp. 111-12). Of course, the authors themselves would do this by 
dividing the docket into their priority, discretionary, and improvident 
categories. My weak rebuttal is that I have confidence in the Justices. 
What is more, I would suggest to the authors that their elaborate 
structure with multiple sub-categories would formalize a great deal of 
complexity in the name of determinant case selection. 
87. There is s~me parallel between screening criteria and standards of constitutional law on 
the merits. Positing on "uncertainty principle," Professor Bradley has suggested that "any at· 
tempt to achieve certainty regarding any important constitutional issue is unlikely to succeed and 
- even if it does succeed in the short run - will inevitably create uncertainty as to more issues 
than it settles." Bradley, supra note 2, at 2. · 
88. See supra text accompanying notes 28-29. 
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They also baldly assert that the new national court "would be un-
likely to promote greater coherence in the law," and they express a 
concern that the present courts of appeals would be "devalue[d]" (p. 
112). I say they are wrong about the first point and I frankly am not 
too concerned about the second. 89 The authors simply leave me be-
hind when they argue that the new court "would be unlikely ... to 
render decisions with sufficient authoritativeness ... to improve upon 
the stability and coherence of federal law" (p. 112). Their most telling 
argument is that the proposed new court would enjoy a special promi-
nence and visibility that would make a special claim on Supreme 
Court review (p. 113). Assuming that there would be such review ju-
risdiction, 90 the authors should hope that the Supreme Court Justices 
would be possessed of the same discipline in dealing with the new 
court as would be required in their own scheme to differentiate prior-
ity, discretionary, and improvident grants. Moreover, the referring of 
the case ought to be understood as the Supreme Court's final qelega-
tion to the new court in all but the most compelling instances. With-
out that understanding, the reference over would be nonsensical. The 
authors are correct to suggest that if this added too greatly to the 
Court's workload that would cut against the proposa~. I do not think 
this would happen.91 Supreme Court workload, however, is Iiot the 
only relevant consideration. They ignore the other justification for 
some slight increase in Supreme Court workload, i.e:, the new court 
would add to the certainty and uniformity of the national law .. What 
seems evident is that the new court would add more capacity for cer-
tainty and uniformity to the federal court system than it would take 
away and the proposed new court could reduce the Supreme Court 
workload by takj.ng over the task of conflict resolution. The proposed 
new national court is the only suggestion under consideration that 
would meet both of. these two pressing needs. 
The authors' last and most serious concern is that the judges on 
the new court might have a judicial phifosophy different from the Jus-
tices, and that the result would be more uncertainty, not less, and 
more conflicts, not fewer (pp. 114-15). First, divergent judicial philos-
89. This reminds me of a story Cl)ief Justice Burger used tQ tell. He was at a Circuit Confer-. 
ence and a circuit judge came up to tell the Chief why the proposal for a ni:w national court was 
e, bad idea. It seems the circuifjudge's wife was proud" of explaining to others that her husband 
we,s on the federal court "second only to the Supreme Court" and that she had told her huspand 
that she did not want to have to explain that his court was only the third highest. 
90. Some argue that this is required by the Con~titutio~. 'see S~ygert, The Proposed National 
Court of Appeals: A Threat to Judicial Symmetry, SI IND. L.J. 327, 329-33 (1976). ·The relation-
ship between the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
in administrative Jaw is analogous. See Note, Disagr~ement,in D. C: '(he Relationship Between 
the Supreme Court and the D. C ·Circuit and Its lmJ?lications for a National Court of Appeals, 59 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1048 (1984). , ' ' · · . 
91. Compare Rehnquist, The· Changing Role of the Supreme Court, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 
(1986) with Hellman, Preserving the Essential Role of the Supreme Court: A Comment on Justice 
Rehnquist's Proposal, 14 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 15 (1986). ' 
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ophies have become a way of life in the High Court and they cannot 
justify opposition to systemic reform. Second, that problem some-
times occurs in the present system of regional courts of appeals.92 
Third, the political process of nomination and confirmation remains 
the long term constitutional answer. 
Having argued against the creation of a new national court, the 
authors return to the problem of overgranting to try their hand at 
"Tailoring the Remedy to the Problem" (pp. 116-27). It rightly has 
been pointed out before that one of the "distinctive strengths" of this 
book raises a basic difficulty: For the most part the authors eschew 
legislative reform in favor of more modest changes in attitude and pro-
cedures on the part of the Justices themselves.93 Consequently, the 
inherent discretion and judgment required for case screening may 
render their hope in the Conference more naive than my faith in Con-
gress. Professor Strauss best expressed the chief concern with relying 
on the Court itself by concluding that "[t]he problem is that ... with-
out interposing a new tribunal of such modest dimensions that the 
Supreme Court can have some reasonable hope of controlling it, the 
Court's incentives to a management orientation, with all that entails, 
will remain unaddressed. " 94 
After the book was written, Congress finally eliminated most all of 
the Court's mandatory jurisdiction.95 The authors are correct to sug-
gest the significance of abolition has been "overstated" (p. 117). Elim-
inating mandatory jurisdiction theoretically reduces both the 
screening and deciding workload of the Court, but the reality is that 
the Court used to approach jurisdictional statements quite similarly to 
certiorari petitions.96 Many cases given plenary review under the re-
cently repealed statutes would have a legitimate claim under the au-
thors' priority discretionary dockets. The authors are also right to 
disapprove of the increasing reliance on summary dispositions. 97 The 
tradition of a separate screening stage and a separate merit decision 
92. See generally Spaeth, Supreme Court Disposition of Federal Circuit Court Decisions, 68 
JUDICATURE 245 (1985); Uelmen, The Influence of the Solicitor General Upon Supreme Court 
Disposition of Federal Circuit Decisions: A Closer Look at the Ninth Circuit Record, 69 JUDICA· 
TURE 361 (1986). 
93. Rowe, supra note 4, at 421. See also Estreicher & Sexton, Improving the Process, supra 
note 5. Over its six editions, various suggestions in SUPREME COURT PRACTICE have been 
adopted as Supreme Court rules. L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL 
AND THE RULE OF LAW 17 (1987). It remains to be seen whether Professors Estreicher and 
Sexton's book will have an impact on the way the Justices order their internal operating 
procedures. 
94. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1136. 
95. Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662 (1988). See generally Boskey & Gressman, The 
Supreme Court Bids Farewell to Mandatory Appeals, 109 S. Ct. LXXXI (Nov. 1, 1988). 
96. See SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 411-13. Only thirty-six cases that 
came to the Court on appeal in O.T. 1985 were decided by signed opinions. Baker & McFarland, 
supra note 2, at 1412. The authors' own modeling criteria assumed away the jurisdiction. 
97. P. 117. See generally SUPREME COURT PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 246-52, 293-300. 
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stage well serves the Court and litigants;98 plenary review, with attend-
ant argument and briefing, should be preserved.99 
Expectedly, Professors Estreicher and Sexton urge the formulation 
of specific criteria for case selection to remedy overgranting and 
overpetitioning (p. 118). Generally, the Court has three choices of ap-
proach: (1) general criteria such as current Rule 17 ("special and im-
portant reasons," "important question[s] of federal law," and conflict 
cases); (2) determinate and illuminating criteria, with the authors 
viewing their own as the best example; or (3) specific guidelines, simi-
lar to a Restatement, with elaborate principles, exceptions and qualifi-
cations, and perhaps examples and commentary. The last is academic 
and not judicial, would bleed the Court of scarce resources, would 
require updating as the Court membership changed, and, most likely, 
would be so divisive as to be futile. Human decisionmaking, at this 
level, resists a quasi-scientific formulaic approach. The realistic choice 
then is between (1) and (2). I already have suggested that there is less 
difference between them than the authors would care to admit. 100 I 
also have suggested that the current structure, choice (1), is not as 
barren and formless as the authors pretend.101 I am skeptical of what 
would be gained by incorporating their 34-page model or the more 
complete 1030-page Supreme Court Practice into the Supreme Court 
Rules. I simply do not agree that such a change would send clearer 
signals to the bar or would constrain the Justices in the exercise of 
their discretion (p. 118). There is something to be said for settled ex-
pectations and accumulated experience under the current criteria. 
98. See, e.g., Commissioner v. McCoy, 108 S. Ct. 217, 219-20 (1987) (per curiam) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting): 
My doubts about summary dispositions encompass concerns about both the parties who 
seek our review and the integrity, perceived and actual, of our proceedings. The Rules of 
this Court urge litigants filing petitions for certiorari to focus on the exceptional need for 
this Court's review rather than on the merits of the underlying case. Summary disposition 
thus flies in the face of legitimate expectations of the parties seeking redress in this Court 
and deprives them of any opportunity to argue the merits of their claims before judgment. 
Moreover, briefing on the merits should be encouraged not only because parties expect and 
deserve it, but because it leads to greater accuracy in our decisions. Briefing helps this Court 
to reduce as much as possible the inevitable incidence of error and confusion in our opinions 
each Term. Finally, the practice of summary disposition demonstrates insufficient respect 
for lower court judges and for our own dissenting colleagues on this Court. 
99. The courts of appeals regrettably have abandoned this commitment to cope with their 
dockets. See generally Baker, supra note 6, at 234-43. 
100. See supra text accompanying notes 64-76. 
101. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
The authors would require that petitions for review include a kind of checklist that might 
include identification of the appealable judgment and a procedural history. Pp. 118-19. It would 
link the request for review and the explicit criteria. If a conflict is alleged, the statement would 
include the precise issue and the case(s) in conflict. Whether or not the criteria are elaborated 
along the lines they suggest, these are good suggestions, which I assume would occur to and 
would be followed-by the careful attorney anyway. My understanding is that the Clerk's Office 
already employs paralegals to conduct a similar kind of pre-screening. See generally SUPREME 
CoURT PRACTICE, supra note 31, at 357-77. 
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Before we scrap it all in favor of a "managerial model," I submit the 
authors must sustain a burden of proof that their book does not. 
Among the other reforms the authors suggest is a certification re-
quirement to avoid frivolous petitions, and they encourage the Court 
to consider sanctions, including perhaps censure, awards of costs, or 
attorneys' fees. 102 I agree but hold out little hope for any appreciable 
impact. 103 They also suggest that the Court create a "second look" 
mechanism. Under this approach, once the Justices vote to grant re-
view, a panel of staff attorneys "of the caliber of Justices' clerks" 
would assess the grant against the same standards the Justices and 
their law clerks presumably had applied. 104 The proposal is simply 
unlikely to work. It is unclear why the staff clerks will do better than 
the elbow clerks or why the Justices would or should listen to the 
second guess. If the authors mean to suggest that something done 
twice is done better, my own preference is for proposals that would 
help get it right the first time.1os 
I agree with three other suggestions, however. Less frequent con-
ferences on petitions might give the Justices a better overview 
(monthly rather than weekly) of their docket (p. 122), replicating the 
more effective screening suggested by the September conference statis-
tics. This also would play to a strength of Chief Justice Rehnquist as a 
presider; accumulations that took a week in recent years have been 
handled in a couple of days. Second, improved transfer and venue 
rules at the intake courts would prevent forum shopping and would 
lessen the burden on parties subject to the law of several circuits. 106 
Third, the Court should continue efforts to modernize its operations 
by further data collection and research (p. 122). 
As a kind of postscript, Professors Estreicher and Sexton add sug-
gestions they deem problematical but still preferable to a new national 
102. Pp. 119-20. The authors are careful to note that other commentators, not themselves, 
have concluded that an "irresponsible bar" and "unscrupulous" petitioners are a source of a 
significant number of frivolous petitions. P. 186 n.14. 
103. The Courts of Appeals have experimented with such requirements to little avail. See 
FED. R. APP. P. 35; FIFrH CIR. R. 35.2.2. See generally Baker, supra note 6, at 271-73. See also 
FED. R. APP. P. 38. Supreme Court determinations of sanctions are possible, but have been 
rarely used. SUP. Cr. R. 49.2; Tatum v. Regents of Nebraska-Lincoln, 462 U.S. 1117 (1983). 
And frequent imposition would require articulable standards and deliberation and agreement in 
application, thus expending scarce Court resources. Rowe, supra note 4, at 421. 
104. Pp. 120-21. While I am confident that no one but law clerkS believe in the influence of 
"law clerk justice" on the decisions on the merits, I share an old skepticism of any mechanism 
that increases staff influence on the screening process. See Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of 
the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT 74 (Dec. 13, 1957). 
105. Another example of their tendency to ask the Court to return again and again to the file 
is their proposal for a "straw vote" on the merits before granting review to determine if a given 
case presents a proper vehicle for establishing doctrine by a clear majority. P. 121. 
106. Pp. 122-23. Venue procedures currently are much too complex and too metaphysical. 
See, e.g., Ellis v. Great Southwestern Corp., 646 F.2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1981). See generally Note, 
Intercircuit Conflicts and the Enforcement of Extracircuit Judgments, 95 YALE L.J. 1500 (1986). 
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court. I agree that the "Rule of Fmir" should not be changed to a 
"Rule of Five."107 It is somewhat doubtful that the Justices them-
selves could properly effect this change in tradition. 108 And a Rule of 
Five likely would create the appearance that screening foreshadowed 
the decision on the merits, might increase the reversal rate, and most 
important, would end the tradition of an agenda set by a minority, all 
for little gain. 
The authors do not favor the creation of appellate courts special-
ized by subject matter because such courts would "sacrifice the bene-
fits of percolation," would be "vulnerable to capture by special 
interests," and "if given responsibility over controversial subjects 
would require active Supreme Court supervision" (p. 127). I tend to 
agree. A specialized tax court might be appropriate today. And some 
day, we may see a quite different structure of specialized intermediate 
courts. 109 But I prefer a new national court in the generalist American 
appellate tradition.110 
The authors also would move away from the paradigm of party 
control and case determination (pp. 130-31), since their view of the 
Court's role is to chart national policy. Limited grants of review, even 
reformulating the issues presented, might allow the Court to better 
shape its agenda (p. 131). They would place greater reliance on amici 
107. Pp. 123-24. See generally Stevens, supra note 77. 
108. The Court members in 1924 made representations to Congress that access would be 
preserved through this device, representations which are part of the legislative record of the 
Judges' Bill i!Ild create a kind of separation of powers estoppel. See Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts 
of Appeals and of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearings on H. R. 8206 Before the 
House Comm. on the Judfciary, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. 8, 26-27 (1924) (statements of Justice Van 
Devanter and Chief Justice Taft). 
109. See Griswold, 71 JUDICATURE 52 (1987); Address by Justice Antonin S,calia before the 
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 
15, 1987), reprinted in 34 FED. B. NEWS & J. 252-54 (1987). 
110. The authors explore other techniques to resolve conflicts short of creating a new na-
tional court. I see problems with each alternative, in turn. Congress realistically cannot be ex-
pected to monitor and resolve statutory conflicts and would have no power over constitutional 
conflicts. P. 126. But see Ginsburg & Huber, The Intercircuit Committee, 100 HARV. L. REv. 
1417, 1429-34 (1987). A second alternative is to establish a rule that if after one circuit decides 
an issue and a panel in a second circuit disagrees, the second court of appeals must go en bane 
and the en bane decision then is binding nationally. P. 124. See Note, Securing Uniformity in 
National Law: A Proposal for National Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 87 YALE L.J. 1219 
(1978). For the authors this does not allow sufficient percolation. I worry that a majority of one, 
court of appeals - a three-judge m11-jority on the First Circuit with its complement of five judges 
- would set national policy. Also lost would be the valuable background and expertise of some 
circuits, such as the District of Columbia Circuit in administrative matters. The same and simi-
lar problems freight other variations, such as constituting random ad hoc panels to resolve con-
flicts, providing the Supreme Court with a reference power to randomly designated en bane 
courts, p. 126, or declaring that the first court of appeals to decide an issue en bane binds the 
others. See Coleman, The Supreme Court of the United States: Managing Its Caseload to Achieve 
Its Constitutional Purpose, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 18-20 (1983); Goldberg, Managing the 
Supreme Court's Workload, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 353 (1984). Already, the en bane mecha-
nism has pro11en more of a problem than a solution for the courts of appeals. The solution must 
be on the same order of magnitude as the conflict problem. 
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curiae, such as the Solicitor General, relevant interest organizations 
(they list the ACLU and the AFL-CIO), and "academic experts," es-
pecially in the initial phase of determining whether to grant review (p. 
131). Just how the amici would participate is left to our imagination. 
I would have thought the effort should be to reduce the screening bur-
den, not to add to it or to make it more complicated. Besides the 
institutional litigators and the legion of national organizations who 
rain green briefs on the Court already, the authors would have the 
Justices invite still others to lodge their views on the merits. The "ex-
pertise of interested amici and scholars" would assist "the Justices 
[who now must] 'fend for themselves" with only the help of "law 
clerks, however talented they may be .... " (p. 132). The Justices 
could borrow from the administrative process and "issue tentative 
opinions in the hope of eliciting written comments from affected orga-
nizations and academic experts" (p. 132). 
Enough, I say, enough. 
It is difficult to believe that the authors are serious, and, therefore, 
I need not be. Why not give up this whole pretense of judging cases 
and become a full-fledged manager of public policy? Cases and the 
dockets would give way' to policy issues on the agenda. Oral argu-
ments, briefs and records on appeal would give way to public hearings 
with testimony from witnesses who bring prepared statements and re-
ports. Lobbyists could then visit the Court in formal session and the 
Justices individually. Brilliant professors, typically former law clerks, 
could be hired as staff to plan the hearings and help draft the Court's 
regulations and report. The Court might award research grants to ac-
ademic institutions, like the New York University Law Review, to con-
duct independent studies, and might hire consultants and auditors to 
oversee its work. While such a system would "expand substantially 
the informational base upon which national law is made" (p. 131), its 
name is not "the Supreme Court as Manager" but "Congress." These 
are silly proposals, for the most part, and they should not take away 
too much from the authors' better previous efforts. 
I have two further, more serious, responses. First, doctrines such 
as standing, ripeness, mootness, nonjusticiability, et cetera, have the 
purpose of separating the judicial power from the legislative and exec-
utive. This is both constitutional and wise. It cannot be gainsaid that 
the Supreme Court must remain a court to have a legitimate role. Sec-
ond, the remaining tinkering changes the authors suggest by way of 
intramural reforms have a distinctly marginal potential. In the last 
thirty years, the Justices have added staff and clerks, have modernized 
equipment, have streamlined procedures, and have developed adminis-
trative capacity. Anyone familiar with the Court must agree that 
there are not many tinkering changes left that promise much greater 
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efficiency. The commentator's responses "Do more!" and "Do bet-
ter!" fall flat. 
CONCLUSION 
The authors admit that "undoubtedly" their suggestions are "in 
need of further refinement" (p. 135). I agree. Their theme still is that 
"[i]t is not the Supreme Court's job to ensure justice in the particular 
case" (pp. 135-36). "What is needed," Professors Estreicher and Sex-
ton tell us, "is a systematic, hard-headed appraisal of how the Court 
can best employ its scarce- decisional resources to perform its essential 
function" (p. 136). I could not agree more. This review essay is meant 
to suggest strengths and weaknesses in their effort. In this review es-
say, I have accepted their invitation to the dialogue. 
Professor Estreicher and Sexton's work has already influenced the 
larger debate over the role of the Supreme Court and the more imme-
diate proposals to reform the structure of the federal court system, and 
it will continue to do so. Ultimately, if Congress does not ordain and 
establish a new national court, we must ask "whether we are prepared 
for the consequences of a Court four times' as remote from the rest of 
the nation's judiciary as it was when a perceived caseload crisis 
prompted creation of its current jutjsdictional relationships."111 The 
authors accept that scenario and I do not. 
My objection to the authors' orientation is fundamental. At the 
last annual conference of the Association of American Law Schools, 
Judge Harry T. Edwards of the District of Columbia Circuit made the 
point in his keynote speech.112 He -argued that legal education was 
"falling short of any meaningful effort to 'shape the legal profes-
sion.' " 113 He identified t4e caseload crisis as one of the. major 
problems facing the legal system. He cP,astised his audience of law 
professors that "the academic response to the caseload _crisis . . . is 
largely a denial that such~ problem exists.''u4 Jurist after jurist says 
there is a problem;115 the academics deny it. 116 Professor Estreicher 
and Sexton's book is the latest ostrich-like denial. 
I am on Judge Edwards' side. I ask how many statistics and stud-
111. Strauss, supra note 2, at 1135. Professor Strauss concludes that without a new tribunal 
the Supreme Court has insufficient incentive toward a managerial model. Id. at 1136. 
112. Edwards, The Role of Legal Education in Shaping the Profession, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
285 (1988). See also Hufstedler, Bad Recipes for Good Cooks - Indigestible Reforms of the 
Judiciary, 27 ARIZ. L. REv. 785 (1985). 
113. Edwards, supra note 112, at 285. 
114. Id. at 287. 
115. E.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 15-54 (1973); R. 
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-129 (1985). See generally Gazell, 
supra note 22 (citing more than 70 articles); The Supreme Court Workload, 11 HAsrINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 353 (1984). 
116. See supra note 91. 
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ies and testimonials will it take? If I be accused of having a closed 
mind, I defend myself by challenging those who would wait for a judi-
cial gridlock and who would support reforms only on an absolute 
guarantee that they will be perfect solutions. A great dramatist and 
student of human nature once observed: 
The open mind never acts: when we have done our utmost to arrive at a 
reasonable conclusion, we still, when we can reason and investigate no 
more, must close our minds for the moment with a snap and act dog-
matically on our conclusions. The man who waits to make an entirely 
reasonable will dies intestate."117 
Rather than accept the review of two law professors, who spent a year 
at the Supreme Court as law clerks and who analyzed the papers for 
one October Term with the help of law students, I myself prefer the 
views of Chief Justice Burger and Chief Justice Rehnquist, who be-
tween them served on the Supreme Court of the United States for one-
third of a century.11s 
Siskel and Ebert seem to be interesting, articulate, and informed, 
and their efforts to review films are thoughtful and sincere. Sometimes 
I agree with their reviews and sometimes I do not. Likewise, Profes-
sors Estreicher and Sexton seem to be interesting, articulate, and in-
formed. Their efforts to review the Supreme Court are thoughtful and 
sincere. As I have explained at some length, I disagree with much of 
what they have written, but I agree with several of their ideas. That is 
why I give Redefining the Supreme Court's Role: A Theory of Manag-
ing the Federal Judicial Process one "thumb down" and one "thumb 
up." 
117. G. B. SHAW, ANDROCLES AND THE LION 107 (1957 ed.). 
118. Both Chief Justices have strongly endorsed the proposal for a new national court. See 
W. BURGER, 1985 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 15·20; W. REHNQUIST, 1987 YEAR-
END REPORT ON THE JUDICIARY 7. 
